Implications of Research into Substance-Related Desires
Despite the advent of improved pharmacological treatments to alleviate substance-related desires, psychological approaches will continue to be required. However, the current psychological treatment that most specifically focuses on desires and their management-cue exposure-has not lived up to its original promise. The paper argues that current psychological approaches to desire do not adequately incorporate our knowledge about the factors that trigger, maintain and terminate episodes. It asserts that the instigation and maintenance of desires involve both associative and elaborative processes. Understanding the processes triggering the initiation of intrusive thoughts may assist in preventing some episodes, but occasional intrusions will be inevitable. A demonstration of the ineffectiveness of thought suppression may discourage its use as a coping strategy for desire-related intrusions, and mindfulness meditation plus cognitive therapy may help in accepting their occurrence and letting them go. Competing tasks may be used to reduce elaboration of desires, and competing sensory images may have particular utility. The application of these procedures during episodes that are elicited in the clinic may allow the acquisition of more effective strategies to address desires in the natural environment.
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Over the last 10 years, there has been a resurgence of interest in craving or desire 1 for alcohol and other substances (Alcohol Research & Health, 23 (3) ; Addiction, 95, Supp. 2), perhaps partly fuelled by the release of pharmacotherapies for alcohol misuse which lower craving or desire for alcohol (O'Malley, Krishnan-Sarin, Farren et al., 2002; Paille, Guelfi, Perkins et al., 1995) . However this increased interest appears to have had relatively little impact on the development of innovative psychological treatments for craving.
It might be argued that developments in relevant psychological therapies are unnecessary, given the pace of refinements in pharmacotherapies. However, an understanding of the ongoing need for relevant psychological intervention may be obtained by considering the possible targets for pharmacotherapy. Three main medication targets may be identified.
First, the agent may provide temporary symptomatic relief from craving for alcohol. However such relief is unlikely to completely and universally eliminate desire (Monti, Rohsenow, Hutchison et al., 1999) . Furthermore, since episodes of desire are reported by people in the context of alcohol cues years after the cessation of alcohol use, agents that focus on symptomatic relief may leave the person vulnerable to difficulties after its discontinuation.
For example once naltrexone is ceased, its maintained effectiveness appears to substantially rely on the person's acquisition of skills in controlling consumption (O'Malley, Jaffe, Chang et al.,1996) .
A second focus could be a reduction of desire by reducing positive expectancies from drinking. There is some evidence that repeated trials of drinking while taking naltrexone may reduce the pleasure associated with alcohol use (Volpicelli, Alterman, Hayahida et al., 1992) , and thereby have an indirect effect on future craving. But such results would be rapidly reversed if the person drank after cessation of naltrexone -in fact, the elimination of opiate Beating the Urge 4 tolerance would open the possibility of short-term increases in the pleasure obtained from alcohol use. Other strategies to deal with the desire would still be required.
A third focus could be a reversal of neural sensitization to alcohol-related cues or cognition (cf. Robinson & Berridge, 1993 that was developed over repeated occasions of alcohol use. If a permanent and specific reduction of this sensitization could be achieved without substantial negative effects, this would be a major breakthrough in the management of craving, but the prospect of such an intervention appears remote at this stage. Even if this therapy were successfully developed, it would still leave the person with the need to deal with some level of desire for alcohol, and with a risk of renewed sensitization if medication was discontinued and alcohol use resumed. In relation to all three targets of pharmacotherapy, a critical role for psychological intervention remains.
Implications of known features of desires
A maximally effective strategy to deal with desires requires an application of a wider theoretical approach than is currently used. This approach, outlined in our recent papers (May, Andrade, Panabokke, & and Kavanagh, in press2004) , incorporates a wide range of empirical data on desires into a single coherent theory (Elaborated Intrusion, or EI Theory).
We argue that the primary tenets of the theory each have important implications for the management of desires.
Instigation and maintenance of dDesires involves both associative and elaborative processes
While it is well established that people can initiate episodes of desire on instruction (e.g. by creating a sensory image of a substance-Cepeda-Benito & , desires
Beating the Urge 5 often emerge in the form of intrusive verbal thoughts or sensory images, without a conscious effort being involved. The distinction of intrusive and elaborative thoughts is a specific instance of the distinction between 'automatic' and 'controlled' processing, which has a long empirical history (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) . Associative or automatic involvement in desires is supported by a body of research, including studies on lexical priming during deprivation (Jarvik, Gross, Rosenblatt et al., 1995) , and on the salience of substance-related associations among heavy users (Stacy, 1995) . There are at least three important implications of this distinction for management of desires.
Understanding the elicitation of intrusive desires may aid in their prevention
We also now have substantial evidence about the factors that elicit intrusive thoughts about a desired target. Exposure to the sight, smell or taste of a substance tends to trigger or increase desire (Cooney, Gillespie, Baker et al., 1987; Niaura, Abrams, Pedraza et al., 1992) , as do other contextual stimuli in which consumption usually occurs (Palij, Rosenblum, Magura et al., 1996) . There is also evidence that initially neutral cues can be conditioned to elicit craving by association with the drug (Dols, Willems, van den Hout et al., 2000) . An attentional bias to substance-related cues has now been demonstrated (Mogg, Bradley, Field et al., 2003) , and in some studies using a masking procedure, psychophysiological effects can even be obtained preattentively (Ingjaldsson, Thayer, & Laberg, 2003) .
Internal associates may also elicit desires. When people are able to consume alcohol, priming of positive expectancy words results in greater consumption than priming of neutral words (Roehrich, & Goldman, 1995) -an effect which we argue is probably mediated by associations with alcohol. Deprivation such as withdrawal from a substance also elicits intrusive desires (Jarvik et al., 1995) , but the deprivation does not necessarily have to be to the same substance, as long as the target is salient (Alsene, Li, Chaverneff et al., 2003) . In
Beating the Urge 6 fact, a negative mood can be sufficient to elicit desire for a substance (Maude-Griffin, & Tiffany, 1996) , perhaps especially where there are strong associations between substance use and relief of the mood. Conscious desires can also be elicited or enhanced by the awareness of anticipatory responses, such as salivation in response to alcohol cues (Monti, Rohsenow, Rubonis et al., 1993a) .
The psychological intervention that has specifically focused on conditioned associations has been cue exposure (CE). CE was designed both to reduce the potency of the external cues that triggered drinking, and to train behavioral resistance to alcohol use (Hodgson & Rankin, 1976; Rankin, 1982) . Drawn from conditioning models of psychopathology, and originally applied in anxiety disorders (Rachman, Hodgson & Marks, 1973) , CE involves successive exposures to the sight and smell of alcohol, with instructions to attempt to resist drinking (Blakey & Baker, 1980) . Studies of alcohol-dependent people in treatment show that differential reductions in desire and salivary reactivity or swallowing occur over successive exposure sessions (Staiger, Greeley & Wallace, 1999) , with these falls being restricted to individuals who show an initial response to the alcohol cues (Monti et al., 1993a) . Consistent with other research on craving and on emotion (Lang, 1979) some desynchrony across response domains is sometimes seen (McCusker & Brown, 1995) .
CE appears to be more effective than control interventions such as relaxation training (Drummond & Glautier, 1994) . It is at least as effective as other cognitive-behavioral treatment (CBT; Heather, Brodie, Wale et al., 2000; Sitharthan, Sitharthan, Hough & Kavanagh, 1997) , although it is not consistently better than other CBT (Dawe, Powell, Richards, D. et al., 2002; Heather et al., 2000; cf. Sitharthan et al., 1997) . A systematic review by Conklin and Tiffany (2002) obtained an overall effect size against comparison treatments that was not significant (d = 0.0868). An additive response from CE might be Beating the Urge 7 expected if it provided an important missing element. However CE does not significantly add to the impact of CBT, even when the exposure occurs within a dysphoric affective context (Kavanagh et al., in submission) .
Why has cue exposure not shown stronger effects? One possibility is that a very limited view of relevant stimuli is usually applied, where the primary focus is on exposure to alcoholic drinks rather than contextual cues that trigger desire. There are difficulties in providing the exposure to the appetitive target within the full range of stimulus settings in which alcohol cues are likely to be experienced (Conklin & Tiffany, 2002) , and in fact the training typically focuses on exposure in the clinic (albeit with attempts to simulate a drinking environment and include self-administered exposure between sessions; Sitharthan et al., 1997; cf. Dawe et al., 1993) . The standard procedure is also limited by its failure to incorporate advances in knowledge about classical conditioning and extinction (Conklin & Tiffany, 2002) . Examples may include the use of an extinction cue to inhibit renewal of responses in a new context, spacing of sessions to restrict spontaneous recovery, and a requirement of extinction across multiple domains (Conklin & Tiffany, 2002) . A problem with demonstrating more powerful effects than other treatments may be that any effective treatment is likely to result in self-administered cue exposure in the natural environment (as long as the person does not flee from critical situations and has effective behavioral control).
Even if cue exposure were further improved, supported exposure to the full range of external and internal associates could not be envisaged, given the wide range of these associations. One strategy to deal with the ongoing risk of craving and relapse has been to assist the person to predict and avoid situations where associations with the substance are particularly strong and related coping strategies are too weak to allow resistance of substance use (Chaney, O'Leary, & Marlatt, 1978) . While affective and physiological contexts are often
Beating the Urge 8 included in this process, we argue that there has been insufficient attention to the maintenance of positive mood and physiological deprivation (e.g. hunger, thirst, fatigue) as a preventive strategy to avert or ameliorate craving episodes. As we will argue below, pleasurable activities that demand attention may be especially useful in limiting elaboration of desires. However prevention will not always be successful, and situational avoidance is a primitive and functionally limiting approach. The person also needs to be able to deal with episodes of desire that continue to occur. Attempts have been made to address this issue, for example by training resistance to substance use during cue exposure trials (Monti, Rohsenow, Rubonis et al., 1993b) . However, strategies to control craving within cue exposure (as against behavioral resistance) have been less developed, and some have dubious scientific basis (e.g.
imagery of cutting the desire with a sword; Monti et al., 1993b) . Further development of strategies that may be practiced within cue exposure sessions is required.
One of the distressing aspects of desire episodes during periods of attempted control or abstinence appears to be a concern over the meaning of the event (e.g. "I am not in control if I have any thoughts about the substance at all"). Demonstrating the involuntary nature of intrusive thoughts provides a basis for challenging overly negative attributions about these thoughts. Desire induction within the laboratory could not only illustrate that desires can be elicited without an implication of weakness or unconscious wishes, it could also be used to illustrate the nonspecific nature of deprivation and the possibility for errors in the attribution of eliciting conditions (e.g. by using contexts where the person is hungry, thirsty or tired).
Participants could be taught to evaluate the accuracy of their attribution (Beck et al., 1993) , lower unwanted arousal and use substitutive behavior to reduce the sense of deficit (e.g.
drinking orange juice instead of alcohol). Additional possible strategies require further consideration of the nature of desires.
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Suppression of intrusive desires is ineffective
When people attempt to suppress thoughts about substances, they actually think about them more (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994 )-a phenomenon that is captured by the familiar example, "Don't think about white bears". From empirical work on thought suppression in other contexts, we would expect this tendency to be particularly pronounced when there are other task demands (Wegner, 1994) . This is because the attempted suppression of intrusions requires a significant investment of limited cognitive resources, and concurrent tasks also place demands on these resources. Furthermore, the monitoring of suppression violations also triggers intrusive thoughts.
Interestingly, standard cue exposure procedures avoid thought suppression during the actual exposure sessions, requiring that attention be paid to the stimuli. However, there is no current treatment that provides a demonstration of the effects of thought suppression within sessions. Preliminary pilot data from our laboratory on ten participants with alcohol misuse suggests that the contrast between the strength of an urge before and after thought suppression offers credible evidence that this strategy is counter-productive. We intend to collect further on the efficacy of this technique in addressing the problem of suppression.
If suppression of desire-related thoughts is ineffective, what can a person do?
Deliberate elaboration of the thought is likely to increase the range of positive features that are attended to, and therefore increase the strength of the desire and the difficulty in resisting it. Attentional factors in resisting temptation were demonstrated clearly in the body of research on delay of gratification by children (e.g. Mischel, Ebbeson, & Raskoff-Zeiss, 1972 ). This seems to leave the person in a cleft stick.
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Part of the answer may lie in the nature of intrusive thoughts. Preliminary unpublished data from our own group supports the notion that even in people attending treatment for alcohol misuse, many of their thoughts about alcohol are relatively transient. Of an initial 49 participants who reported on their thoughts about alcohol in the previous 24 hours, 92%
reported experiencing at least some thoughts about drinking that "just pop in and vanish"
without an attempt to eliminate them. This suggests that if both suppression and elaboration can be avoided, many intrusive thoughts will be relatively transient. A cognitive approach based on mindfulness mediationmeditation is one method that may allow this to occur (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Teasdale, 1999) . Up to now, mindfulness-based congitive therapy has mainly been applied to dysfunctional cognitions, such as in depression (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale, Segal, Williams et al., 2000) . The person learns to maintain a calm detachment to mental events, where their presence is observed and accepted, rather than attempting to suppress the thoughts or ruminate upon them. As has already been noted by other writers (Breslin, Zack, & McKain, 2002) , this method may also be applicable to episodes of desire. The "accept and move on" strategy provides an opportunity for the intrusion to remain a fleeting thought. Furthermore, the instruction to adopt a detached acceptance of desire-related thoughts may assist in avoiding problematic secondary distressing cognitions about the desire. There is no published research to date on the effectiveness of this technique in the management of desires, but its potential is clear.
Elaboration of desire demands limited attentional and memory resources
The ability of desires to capture attention and working memory resources is no news to anyone who has experienced a strong desire, and it also has empirical support. For example, probe reaction time is slowed during exposure to substance-related cues, and this slowing is associated with the level of desire immediately after the task (e.g. Sayette, Monti, Beating the Urge 11 Rohsenow et al., 1994) . Effects on cognitive tasks are primarily seen where the task has a high cognitive demand, such as the reading of very complex sentences, or reading by people with lower reading ability (Zwaan & Truitt, 1998) . Brain activation studies also provide support for the involvement of areas related to working memory, explicit episodic memory, facilitation of emotional memory encoding and obsessive thoughts (e.g. Grant, London, Newlin et al., 1996) .
The competition of desires and other tasks for limited working memory resources offers an intriguing possibility for intervention. It may not only be that desires can interfere with other tasks-perhaps a task that demanded working memory resources may also inhibit the intensity of desires or at least interrupt elaboration. Consideration of the types of desire cognitions that are most closely related to the affective intensity of desires may suggest which types of task may be most beneficial.
Imagery is a key type of desire cognition
Imagery is frequently used to elicit desires (Tiffany, & Drobes, 1990) , and the vividness of the image is positively correlated with the intensity of the desire it induces (Harvey, Kemps, & Tiggemann, in press) . Imagery is also reported to be a frequent feature of naturally occurring desires (May et al., 2004; Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994) . Furthermore, imagery appears to be very important in anxiety-related disorders (e.g. Holmes, Grey & Young, in press).
The involvement of imagery in desires offers the possibility, in principle, for the control of desires through the modification of desire imagery. A version of this approach already in existence is covert sensitization, in which the desired target or its image is paired with an extremely negative one (such as vomiting) on successive conditioning trials. Despite the sound theoretical grounding of this approach, covert sensitization has not displayed a Beating the Urge 12 consistently strong impact on sustained response control (Elkins, 1980; Lichstein, & Sallis, 1981; Miller & Dougher, 1989) . Better results are obtained where the induced nausea is consistently elicited (Miller & Dougher, 1989) . Part of the problem may be a difficulty some people experience in voluntarily generating images-and perhaps their aversive nature may discourage image retention by participants. Some increased effect can be obtained with the addition of an aversive physical stimulus such as a noxious odour (Miller & Dougher, 1989) .
However a significant ongoing weakness of counter-conditioning is that it runs a risk of rapid extinction if the desired target is encountered outside treatment sessions in the absence of the added noxious stimulus (especially if it is paired with some positive effects).
Modification of the imagery may be more effective if it were done in ways that are less likely to be later disconfirmed. One way to accomplish this would be to pair the object or its image with negative consequences of consumption (Miller & Dougher, 1989) . This might be especially effective where the negative consequences are proximal events of high probability. Rapid smoking attempts to do exactly this. In that procedure, participants are asked to smoke a series of cigarettes in rapid succession, and to pay attention to sensations of nausea, increased heart rate and respiratory discomfort (Barkley, Hastings & Jackson, 1977) .
This technique has been demonstrated to impact on subsequent craving (Houtsmuller & Stitzer, 1999) , although its effect on smoking has been variable (Poole, Sanson-Fisher, & German, 1981) , and its application in cardio-pulmonary disease has been controversial (Hall, Sachs, Hall, & Benowitz, 1984) .
Frequently our anticipation of the stimulus is more positive than the actual experience -our coffee, for example, is too weak, too bitter, or is stewed. In this situation, an approach based on cognitive therapy may be employed to test and modify the beliefs (Beck et al., 1993) . This method at least initially operates via controlled or elaborative processing rather Beating the Urge 13 than directly on associations (which presumably may be rapidly appearing image fragments or episodic memories rather than being restricted to verbal associates). An implication is that the image modification will typically be after the initial image and its affective accompaniment have emerged. Substantial relearning may be required before the less positive memory is the more salient and new affective responses are automatised.
Even if the imagery cannot easily be modified, imagery may be a particularly fruitful target for an interference task. Our own previous research on affective imagery showed that a concurrent visuo-spatial task detracted from the intensity of concurrent imagery about distressing events, and also moderated the distress that was elicited (Kavanagh, Freese, Andrade, & May, 2001 ). However, consistent with a distinction between separate working memory sub-systems for visuo-spatial and auditory material (Baddeley, 1986 ), a concurrent auditory task did not impede the maintenance of visual images, or affect the emotional responses to them (Kavanagh et al., 2001 ).
Since other data from our laboratory suggested that visual imagery was more significant in smoking than was auditory imagery (May et al., 2004) , we anticipated that the formation of visual images would interfere with a desire to smoke to a greater extent than would auditory images. An experiment by Panabokke, May, Eade, Andrade & Kavanagh (under review) confirmed that this was the case, in smokers who were deprived of cigarettes overnight and then underwent an imagery-based urge induction. A study by Harvey et al. (in press) found similar results when dieters were given a food-related imagery task and then were asked to form other auditory or visual images.
This area of treatment development is still in its infancy. It may be that a variety of other tasks may also be useful in addressing desires-for example, preliminary data from our own laboratory suggests that even a verbal working memory task such as serial 7s sevens
Beating the Urge 14 (counting backwards from a large number by sevcns) may assist. However, we predict that tasks that key most closely to the aspects of the experience that have the greatest affective piquancy-and we suggest that these aspects are typically sensory in nature-will be most effective.
While craving is initially rewarding, expected delays in consumption are aversive
Consistent with the naïve everyday view that thinking about a desired object is at least initially very pleasurable, the induction of desire in the context of expected ability to obtain the object is accompanied by positive affect (Zinser, Baker, Sherman, et al., 1992) .
Subjective desire also tends to be associated with an activation of limbic regions that are implicated in emotional processing and reward (Childress, Mozley, McElgin et al., 1999) .
However, where deprivation is significant and there is no immediate prospect of obtaining the desired object, negative emotion is experienced (Zinser et al., 1992) , and the sense of deprivation is heightened. During an attempt at behavioral restraint, the emotion may be experienced as guilt (McDiarmid & Hethrington, 1995) , or anxiety (Monti et al., 1993a) .
Over time, there is evidence that the extent of the positive reaction is blunted, even though the desired object is highly salient (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) .
Several implications for treatment follow. One is that some elaboration of this very rewarding or highly salient cognition will be hard to prevent. Therefore, as in the management of chronic pain (Turk, 2002) , some "break-through" of desire related thoughts may be expected, even if the person is highly skilled at preventing desire episodes or diverting attention when they do occur. Increased tolerance for some discomfort from craving, without engaging in consumption, will still be needed. This once again suggests that mindfulness training may be of assistance. A second implication is that cognitive therapy to deal with secondary negative cognitions underpinning anxiety or guilt may often be required.
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Mood maintenance techniques may not only be useful in preventing episodes, but also in addressing the negative consequences of desires. Finally, given these affective links to desire, an activity may more effectively divert attention from a desire if the competing activity is itself highly rewarding. Specific techniques that could be used during episodes of desire may include relaxation or positive mood induction (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994) . Cue-assisted relaxation with pleasurable multi-sensory imagery might be especially useful, because of its potential to interfere with the creation of target-related imagery.
Desire is not the only factor in consumption
None of the above should be taken to imply that we see the control of desire as routinely being the sole focus of treatment for substance misuse. While a proximal measurement of desires demonstrates a significant association with subsequent lapses (Shiffman, Engberg, Paty et al., 1997) , we know that many people are able to resist consumption even in the context of intense desire, and that lapses can occur even when desires are relatively mild (Tiffany, 1990) . Within Elaborated Intrusion Theory, consumption is determined by multiple social-cognitive variables (Bandura, 1986) , including the extent that competing incentives are present (Cohen, Liebson, Faillace, & Allen, 1971) or negative expectancies of consumption predominate (Breiner, Stritzke, & Lang, 1999) . Consumption is also expected to be affected by availability of the target and situational challenges involved in behavioral control (Shiffman, Paty, Gnys et al., 1996) , and by the person's abilities (and related self-efficacy) in obtaining or resisting consumption in those situations (Sitharthan & Kavanagh, 1990) .
A focus on desires may therefore be useful in reducing the risk of reversion to substance misuse, and it may reduce the disruption and distress that often accompanies them.
However, it is unlikely to be the whole story in an effective treatment, unless the person Beating the Urge 16 already has other requisite skills in their repertoire. Evidence on the efficacy of brief intervention for alcohol misuse suggests that many people do indeed have these skills already (Miller, & Wilbourne, 2002) , but some additional skills training may often still be required (Kavanagh, Sitharthan, Spilsbury, et al., 1999) . We therefore view control-oriented approaches such as cognitive-behavioral treatment (Galanter & Kleber, 1999) as being of continued importance. This treatment typically includes elements such as self-monitoring of behavior, examining the functional relationship between environmental cues and consumption, and training a range of relevant control skills (Mattick & Jarvis, 1994) . In some cases, the development of a context that prompts and rewards resistance to substance use may be critical to success (Hunt, & Azrin, 1973) .
A summary of a proposed intervention for desires: A new role for cue exposure?
We suggest that existing evidence, as summarized in the tenets of Elaborated Intrusion Theory (May et al., in press2004) , offers plausible suggestions for the development of improved strategies to address desires for substances. While habituation of desires in cue exposure may have some utility, the wide range of eliciting cues will continue to limit the impact ability of this procedure to have a strong impact. We propose that the elicitation of desires within the laboratory and clinic-whether by cue exposure, deprivation or directed imagery-can however be used to illustrate factors that can induce desires, and the potential for attributional errors during non-specific deprivation. It can be used to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of suppression, and, in contrast, the effectiveness of accepting and moving on during mindfulness mediationmeditation. The distinction between the use of competing tasks in suppression and in the process of accepting thoughts and moving on can be illustrated, and the person can discover and practise effective distraction techniques such as the use of unrelated sensory images. At the same time, the tendency for some "break-through" of desire Beating the Urge 17 cognitions and the tendency for these thoughts to swamp the attentional field can be shown.
Cognitive therapy for dysfunctional beliefs about desires can be undertaken during episodes of desire, with attributions of poor control being avoided, whilst retaining the use of the desire as a flag for increased behavioral vigilance. We anticipate that, when combined with empirically supported techniques for behavioral control, such an approach to desires will be a powerful intervention.
Beating the Urge 18 Footnotes 1. In the clinical literature, craving is usually used to refer to very high levels of desires (Kozlowski, Mann, Wilkinson, & Poulos, 1989) . However, we can identify little evidence to support the idea that increasing intensity of desires displays a qualitative change rather than operating as a continuous variable. We therefore use the terms "desire" and "craving" interchangeably in this paper.
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